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The Faux pas of a Vert Galant:
The Historiography of Henry IV's
Military Leadership
Annette Finley-Croswhite*
Old Dominion University

Henry IV is one of the few historical figures whose
military reputation rests on the fact that he operated
successfully during the course of his life at all definable
levels of military command: as a soldier and partisan
leader, a battlefield tactician, a campaigner, and a national
strategist. He fought in over two hundred engagements,
never lost a battle, and was the major victor in four
landmark battles. Nevertheless, until recently most
judgments by French, British, and American historians,
scholars like Pierre de Vaissière, Sir Charles Oman, Lynn
Montross, and David Buisseret, have portrayed Henry IV
not as a great military commander, but as a risk-taking
opportunist, always the Vert Galant in the guise of a skilled
tactician and cavalryman. He has been condemned as a
casual strategist who was often too shortsighted to take full
advantage of his successes. Even Buisseret, a historian who
*

This paper is dedicated to the memory of Craig M. Cameron, a
social and cultural military historian whose life ended tragically on 30
December 2004 at the age of forty-six. At the time of his death he was
working on a manuscript examining civil-military relations in the
United States during the era of the Vietnam War. I knew him as my
colleague in the Department of History at Old Dominion University
from the time of my arrival in 1991 until his death. Along the way I
learned a great deal from his vision of military history.
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clearly likes Henry and produced a biography in the 1980s
that emphasized his military prowess, dismissed him in the
end as a "poor strategist."1 This negative, or at best
lukewarm, evaluation of Henry IV reflects assumptions by
French historians, military historians, and military scientists
that are based chiefly on post-Westphalian logic which
views decisive battle and military objectives in the context
of modern warfare between nation-states. More recently,
however, scholars like Ronald S. Love have begun to place
early modern warfare into a paradigm that perceives war,
warfare, and military operations as social and political
phenomena not restricted by or to states and not necessarily
the preserve of rational actors with strictly defined
battlefield goals. In the process, they have put history back
into military history. This new perception of conflict and
military engagements lends itself to a revised evaluation of
Henry IV as a military commander and highlights his
1

I want to thank Terence Loveridge for allowing me to restate on
pages 1-6 of this paper words and ideas from an unpublished paper we
jointly authored entitled "Besieging France: Henry IV as a Military
Commander." David Buisseret, Henry IV (London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1984), 25, 35. See also Edgard Boutaric, Institutions militaires
de la France avant les armées permanentes suivies d'un aperçu des
principaux changements survenus jusqu'à nos jours dans la formation
de l'armée (Paris: H. Plon, 1863), 345; Charles W. C. Oman, A History
of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (New York: E. P. Dutton &
Company, 1937), 505; Lynn Montross, War through the Ages (New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), 244; Pierre de Vaissière, Henri IV
(Paris: A. Fayard, 1928), 303; and Daniele Thomas, Henri IV, Images
d'un roi entre realité et mythe (Paris: Héraclès, 1992), 343. For more
positive views of Henry as a military commander see Ronald S. Love,
"All the King's Horsemen: The Equestrian Army of Henry IV,"
Sixteenth Century Journal 22:3 (1991): 511-33; idem., "Henri IV et
Ivry, Le Monarque Chef de Guerre," Revue historique des armées 1
(1991): 11-20; and Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 207-9.

Proceedings of the Western Society for French History

The Faux pas of a Vert galant

81

genius as a general who understood that pressing the
advantages of a particular battle was not as important as
winning the war.
In this contribution to the small but growing revisionist
literature on Henry IV as a military commander, I build on
the work of Ron Love, who along with the French historian
Christian Desplat, has mastered an understanding of both
Henry IV's military role and his political objectives. Love
and Desplat both explain how Henry's two agendas
overlapped, and they emphasize that Henry spent most of
the religious wars engaged in a civil conflict with his own
people. This protracted battle involved Henry in
complicated civil-military relations since the ultimate
outcome of his military command after 1589 was to gain
him the acceptance of the very people he considered his
sons and daughters. The situation, Desplat concludes, lent
itself more to compromise than to radical solution.2 Henry
had to convince those he was fighting of his legitimacy as
king and win their consent to rule. His military decisions,
skirmishes, sieges, set battles, and campaigns were directly
connected to maintaining his course through the political,
religious, and social issues surrounding the civil wars. This
long-term strategic vision ultimately won him the throne. In
the process, he revealed himself to be not only an expert
employer of his century's newest technologies, but also as
Terrence Loveridge has shown, a master of information
dominance.3 Henry well understood that he was not
fighting simply to win battles but to forge a lasting peace.
2

Christain Desplat, "Henri IV le soldat et le capitaine," in
Avènement d'Henri IV. Quatrième Centenaire de la bataille de Coutras,
Volume des actes du colloque Coutras, 16-18 octobre 1987 (Pau: J & D
Éditions, 1989), 90.
3
Terence Loveridge, "Henry IV as a Military Commander" (M.A.
thesis, Old Dominon University, 1999).
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His harshest critics tended to assume that conquest of a
kingdom was his goal when, in fact, his desired end was the
willing consolidation of his realm under his stewardship.4
Thus Henry could not starve Paris into submission during
the 1590 siege of the city and left the ramparts to pursue the
duke of Parma instead.5 On hearing this news, Henry's ally,
Elizabeth I of England, sent an angry letter to the Bourbon
king chastising his behavior.6 From a psychological point
of view, however, Henry's strategy helped to secure the
capitulation of his capital in 1594.
In assessing the historiography of Henry IV as a
military commander, I will first discuss a few of his
military accomplishments. Next I will ponder why someone
who was so successful in battle has been so uniformly
condemned. Finally I will tackle the "but why" question
and argue that historians have wrongly perpetuated a
historiographic legacy in which Henry as a military
commander is conflated with Henry as the Vert Galant. The
origin of this conflation can be found in the very self4

For contemporary evidence see Henry's manifesto of 4 Mar.
1589: Henri IV, Recueil des Lettres Missives de Henri IV, ed. Jules
Berger de Xivrey, 7 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1843-58), 2:44358.
5
"Bref Traité des Misères de la Ville de Paris," in Archives
Curieuses de l'Histoire de France depuis Louis XI jusqu'à Louis XVIII,
eds. M. L. Cimber and F. Danjou (Paris: Membres de l'Institut
Historique, 1837), Ser. I, 13:277-8, 281-2; Filippo Pigafetta, Relation
du Siège de Paris par Henri IV, trans. A. Dufour (Paris: Société de
l'histoire de Paris et de l'Ile-de-France, 1875); and Nancy Lyman
Roelker, ed., The Paris of Henry of Navarre as seen by Pierre de
l'Éstoile, Selection from his Mémoires-Journaux (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1958), 190-1.
6
Recueil des Lettres Missives, 3:284-5; and R. B. Wernham,
"Elizabethan War Aims and Strategy," in Elizabethan Government and
Society: Essays presented to Sir John Neale, eds. S. T. Bindoff, J.
Hurstfield, and C. H. Williams (London: Athlone Press, 1961), 354.
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fashioning that the king promoted in his own lifetime:
Henry as both a valiant warrior and an inexhaustible lover.
Henry IV's military
accomplishments and so-called failures
Contemporaries acknowledged that Henry possessed a
keen eye for ground of tactical importance and a
remarkable sense of the tempo, pulse, and patterns of battle.
An early chronicler of the religious wars, Enrico Davila,
wrote in the seventeenth century that Henry could appear
and disappear on the battlefield "like lightning," meaning
Henry had his own brand of "shock and awe" based on
superb use of sixteenth-century tactics and technology.
David Buisseret credits Henry with perfecting a tactic
known as the pistolade in which his cavalry fired their
pistols only after coming into close contact with the enemy
at which point Henry's forces charged with their swords.
Henry also rejected the medieval gendarme or horsemounted, armored knight and relied instead on a new kind
of cavalry soldier called the arquebusier-à-cheval, the
forerunner of the seventeenth-century dragoon. He
achieved remarkable success by combining the use of
infantry armed with pike and firearm with artillery and
light cavalry. Posting musketeers between cavalry
squadrons seems to have been an original idea with Henry.
Perfecting a Huguenot ambush tactic that delivered a
counter-punch attack, he ordered his musketeers to fire in
volleys from multiple ranks and at point blank range into
the flank of the enemy.7 Henry was also open to innovation
and established a number of adapted tactical and
administrative measures that soon became standard within
Europe. He was one of the first commanders in Europe to
7

Oman, 474.
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use common colors among his troops that did not privilege
noble captains over common soldiers.8 He developed his
corps of engineers and had them build impressive systems
of fortresses and trenches when besieging cites, and he
produced the first army field hospital recorded in French
history at the 1597 siege of Amiens.9 He experimented with
new technologies and, according to Christopher Duffy, may
well have invented the petard.10 Additionally, Henry was
not only interested in taking advantage of the printing press
to propagandize his quest for the throne, he also
experimented with map-making. In 1590 he ordered
Jacques Fougeu, a lodging-master with his army, to prepare
maps that would aid the billeting of troops.11 Fougeu
produced over five hundred maps during his tenure with
Henry IV, advancing the science of military cartography in
the process.12
8

Bert S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe:
Gunpowder, Technology, and Tactics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1997), 97; Thomas F. Arnold, Renaissance at War,
(London: Cassel & Company, 2001), 86-7; and Hugh Thomas, History
of the World (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 200.
9
David Buisseret, "Henri IV et l'art militaire," in Henri IV le roi et
la reconstruction du royaume, Volumes des actes du colloque PauNêrac 14-17 septembre 1989, ed. Pierre Tucoo-Chala (Pau: J & D
Editions, 1990), 338-40; and Baron Xavier de Bonnault d'Houët, La
Première Ambulance sous Henri IV (Paris: A. Picard, 1919), 14-5.
10
Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early
Modern World, 1494-1660 (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1979), 111.
11
Joel Kovarsky, "Maps in a Time of War, The Rise of European
Military Cartography," Mercator's World 7 (May/June 2002): 32.
12
David Buisseret, ed., Monarchs, Ministers and Maps: The
Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern
Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 107-8. Buisseret
explains that little is known of military cartography in France before
Fougeu. Sully ran a workshop for cartographers during his life, but
little is known either about this endeavor (111). See also David
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Even while acknowledging these innovations and
achievements, military historians virtually always berate
Henry IV for misuse of his battlefield successes and for
personal recklessness. For example, Henry has been
repeatedly criticized since the sixteenth century for a
perceived failure to exploit his first major victory at the
battle of Coutras in 1587. Numerous historians have
criticized him for failing after defeating the duke of
Joyeuse to take his army straightaway to meet up with a
nearby force of 34,000 German and Swiss troops to march
on Paris and force battle on Henry III.13 Even Henry of
Navarre's ally and close confident the baron of Rosny (later
duke of Sully) wrote that the advantage of Coutras "floated
away like smoke on the wind."14 A more recent critic, Sir
Charles Oman, one of England's most distinguished
military historians in the first half of the twentieth century,
used Coutras and other post-battle actions to label Henry
"the most inconsequent and the most un-Napoleonic of
generals."15 The oft-repeated story with regard to Coutras
goes that after the battle Henry galloped away in the
direction of Béarn to lay the captured standards from his
victory at the feet of his mistress, Corisande d'Andoins.16
Ronald S. Love rejects this assessment of Coutras in an
article published in 1999, in which he underscores that one
cannot separate Henry's military campaigns from his
political goals. In this example Love supports an analysis of
Buisseret, The Mapmakers' Quest: Depicting New Worlds in
Renaissance Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 139.
13
For example, Buisseret, Henry IV, 25; and Thomas, Henri IV,
343.
14
Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully, Les Oeconomies royales
de Sully, eds. David Buisseret and Bernard Barbiche, vol. 1, 1572-1594
(Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1970), 193.
15
Oman, 505.
16
Buisseret, Henry IV, 25.
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the aftermath of Coutras first expounded by Garrett
Mattingly in 1959, although both historians are indebted to
Father Hardouin de Beaumont de Péréfixe's seventeethcentury assessment of the battle.17 Péréfixe, Mattingly, and
Love all argue that Henry of Navarre had nothing to gain in
1587 by engaging Henry III in battle. Aside from the fact
that Henry's army was tired and in need of rest, the army of
Henry III actually blocked the Loire River at that time.
Engaging the Valois king's army might actually have
strengthened the Guise-led Catholic League, a situation that
would have destroyed any hopes Navarre had for an
eventual alliance with Henry III to defeat the League.
Coutras occurred before the Day of the Barricades when
Henry III fled Paris and was discredited in the eyes of his
subjects. The strategy in place in 1587 thus mandated that it
was more important for Henry of Navarre to appear to be a
Calvinist war leader who was loyal to Henry III and intent
on defeating the Guise threat to the realm.18 Love argues,
"But from Navarre's much broader political perspective,
restoring the integrity of his campaign to win the Valois
monarch was more important than securing his short-term
military gains."19
Henry has also been criticized for his rash behavior as a
soldier-king, for taking the lead in battle and so often
putting himself in harm's way. His allies warned that the
Protestant cause would collapse without him, and after
17

Hardouin de Beaumont de Péréfixe, Histoire de Henri-leGrand, Roi de France et de Navarre Suivie d'nn Recueil de Quelques
Belles Actions et Paroles Mémorables de ce Prince (Paris: Edme
Martin, 1661), 78.
18
Garrett Mattingly, The Armada (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1959), 159-60; and Ronald S. Love, "A Game of Cat and Mouse: Henri
de Navarre and the Huguenot Campaigns of 1584-89," Canadian
Journal of History/Annales canadiennes d'histoire 24 (1999): 1, 16-20.
19
Love, "A Game," 20.
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1589 his ministers frequently chastised him for his reckless
pursuit of valor. More recently Edmund Dickerman and
Anita Walker have echoed these sentiments by noting that
Henry seemed oblivious to the fact that every risk he took
compromised the future stability of France.20 But Henry
had good practical reasons for wanting to take the lead in
battle. The nobles in Henry's army, in particular, needed
frequent reminders that he was one of them and their
leader. He certainly knew as well that many of his
cavalrymen were not competent to command critical wings
of his unique force. Additionally, where Henry was not
personally involved, plans had a way of unraveling. At the
battle of Ivry his own squadron began to break up when he
was believed dead and only reassembled in the heat of
battle at his desperate urging. Even after victory was
achieved, post-battle jubilation was subdued until Henry
returned from the field and removed his helmet to prove he
was still alive.21 Henry's victories were personal; he was
the cause for whom his troops fought. Christian Desplat
states, "With Henry IV, the king of France was rebaptized
as the first soldier of the realm; the function of monarchy
had thus returned to its original purpose."22 Accepting the
totality of his monarchical heritage, Henry as warrior
became the embodiment of the state long before his
grandson made the claim.23 His kingly acts of clemency to
survivors, rewards to victors, and gentle admonitions to
those who failed to follow him were meaningless without
his personal role in battle. In this light, Henry actually
20

Edmund H. Dickerman and Anita M. Walker, "The Choice of
Hercules: Henry IV as Hero," The Historical Journal 39:2 (1996): 323.
21
H. C. Davila, The Historie of the Civill Warres of France
(London: R. Roworth, 1647), 902-3.
22
Desplat, 96.
23
Ibid.
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embodies what John Keegan calls "heroic leadership" and
echoes the exemplary risk-taking and raw courage of
Alexander the Great.24
The Vert Galant as "great general"
In Love's 1999 article he identifies a four-hundred-yearold tradition of criticism of Henry IV as a military leader
that he traces to two derogatory quips that Alexander, the
duke of Parma, made about the king's actions in battle.
Love argues that historians have uncritically accepted
Parma's version of Henry IV ever since. "Consequently,"
Love states, "their [historians'] treatments of Henry IV as a
military leader, and especially as a strategist – the major
focus of their disdain – are superficial and repetitive, and
never consider, or grapple with accompanying conditions
or the king's ultimate political objectives."25 Another
sixteenth-century anecdote, the story of Henry leaving the
battlefield at Coutras to join his lover, Corisande
d'Andoins, has similarly been told and retold by historians
to deride Henry's strategic sense. Instead of identifying the
master design in Henry's suspect military decisions,
however, my intent is to explore the anecdote about
Henry's post-Coutras behavior in order to show how
historians have conflated Henry's battlefield prowess with
his oversized libido.
The 20 October 1587 battle of Coutras was Henry's first
major victory. As was typical of almost all his military
engagements, Henry faced a much larger army than his
own: Joyeuse commanded a force of 10,000 versus Henry's
24

John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Viking,
1987), 10-1.
25
Ronald S. Love, "Henry IV and Ivry Revisited: The King as a
Military Leader," Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western
Society for French History 11 (1984): 65.
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6,300 troops. Nevertheless, the Huguenot commander
maneuvered his men into a defensive position, alternating
his troop lines with musketeers and cleverly ordering his
front ranks to kneel. Henry's plan worked so well that
within ten minutes Joyeuse's army was in disarray. The
battle ended less than an hour after it began. Joyeuse and
some 2,500 of his men were killed in that short span of
time while Henry lost less than 500.26 "At least," Henry
supposedly quipped, "nobody will be able to say after this
that we Huguenots never win a battle."27 At this point, the
master narrative goes, the man who in so many other
situations proved to be a consummate opportunist
impulsively left his band of brothers to go find his lover.
Agrippa d'Aubigné seems to have publicized this
anecdote first around 1616 in the publication of his Histoire
Universelle. Aubigné mentions that Henry went to
Corisande and concludes that in doing so he threw "all his
words to the wind and gave up his victory to love."28 The
duke of Sully echoed this same sentiment in his
Oeconomies Royales.29 After Henry's unexpected death, the
story about his post-battle method for relieving stress must
have circulated in popular discourse as the legend of his
greatness grew. During the reign of Louis XIV a man
known as Tallemant des Réaux entertained people in the
salons with stories about Henry's penchant for leaving his
armies to pursue his mistresses. These stories eventually
26

Estimates vary as to how many men were lost at the battle of
Coutras: Oman, 473-80; Montross, 242-3; and Buisseret, Henry IV, 245.
27
Quoted in Mattingly, 157.
28
Théodore-Agrippa d'Aubigné, Histoire Universelle, ed.
Alphonse de Ruble (Paris: Librarie Renouard, 1893), 7:161. The work
was originally published between 1616 and 1620.
29
Sully, 195-6. See as well Recueil des Lettres Missives, 2:602-3.
Sully's work was first published in 1638.
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found their way into racy accounts of Henry's sex life
produced in works like Les Amours de Henri IV published
in the Netherlands in the 1665. By the time François-Eudes
de Mézeray produced a critical summary of Henry's reign
in the 1680s, the essential notion that throughout Henry's
life his sex drive always overpowered his rational thinking
was already the stuff of legend.30 Thus, when analyzing the
battle of Coutras, nineteenth- and twentieth-century
historians, especially military historians, drew uncritically
on a long tradition of evaluating Henry's battlefield
command from the perspective of his sexual persona. The
impact of this misconception was so damaging that it has
obscured historical understanding of his military leadership
ever since.
The story of Henry and his post-Coutras exploits is
actually quite complex. Eight days after the battle, Henry
did in fact quickly leave his disintegrating army in the
hands of the Prince of Condé and set out for Pau where he
spent much of November in the company of Diane
d'Andoins, countess of Guiche and Gramont (1555-1621).31
By that time Diane had already taken to calling herself
Corisande, an affectation she probably took from her deep
interest in chivalric literature. She welcomed Henry, whom
she affectionately dubbed "Petiot," a friend she had known
all of her life and whom she had taken as a lover after the
death of her husband in 1580. Contemporaries considered
the young widow eccentric. She favored grotesque colors in
her retinue and collected a menagerie of wild animals. She

30

Taken from J. H. M. Salmon, "The Afterlife of Henry of
Navarre," History Today 47:10 (1997): 13-4.
31
There are several letters from Henry to Corisande dated Dec.
1587 and Jan. 1588 in the Recueil des Lettres Missives, 2:318-9, 330-3.
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had a flair for poetry and perhaps other hidden talents that
Henry readily indulged.32
The infamous vignette concerning Henry and Corisande
involves the flags and pennants from the battle of Coutras.
Whether he actually took twenty-two captured standards
and other souvenirs from the battle and laid them at the feet
of his lover is hard to say. In one sense it was a great
romantic move in keeping with her love of chivalry. But
the story also has a slightly odd, even kinky, flavor. It
conjures up images of Henry in post-battle heat rolling in
the arms of Corisande on the flags of the vanquished,
rendering perverse the very symbols of their military honor.
In reality, if the story of the flags is true, it was probably a
gallant gesture of thanks on Henry's part to the
noblewoman who supported his cause at Coutras with both
money and troops. It may even be a symbolic story
emphasizing a chivalric Henry who did not butcher his
prisoners after the battle, misdeeds for which Joyeuse was
notorious, nor extract ransoms from them. Instead he
honorably freed those captured during the fight. In this
sense he had acted as a true chevalier and offered himself
to la belle Corisande as the ideal warrior-hero. In the hands
of historians, however, the story of Henry and Corisande
has become an indicator of the future king's supposed
failure to capitalize on victory and a trope for his flawed
military vision.
This misreading of Henry and his strategic brilliance is
due in part to the king's own efforts to fashion his heroic
32

George Edward Slocombe, Henri IV (Paris: Payot, 1933), 116;
Daniele Thomas, 349; and idem., Henri IV et la reconstruction du
royaume (Pau: Editions de la Réunion des musées, 1989), 212, image
262 ("Diane d'Andoins, comtesse de Guiche et sa fille, Catherine de
Gramont"). For more on Corisande see Raymond Ritter, Cette grande
Corisande (Paris: A. Michel, 1936).
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persona in the guise of a magnificent lover. Henry was his
own best promoter, and he encouraged the development of
political propaganda that portrayed him as the emblematic
warrior-hero. Edmund Dickerman and Anita Walker
acknowledge that "[w]ar remained the activity he most
valued; his identity as warrior the core-constituent of his
self-image."33 Yet his reputation as a lover of extraordinary
abilities was also juxtaposed or implied in the countless
artistic renderings of his likeness as Hercules produced
during his reign.34 References to his dynamic sexual energy
persisted even after the old king began to experience bouts
of impotence late in his reign.35 Katherine B. Crawford
argues that this duality in Henry's representation as hero
and lover spanned his entire reign and grew out of his
complex sexual behavior which contemporaries witnessed
from time to time.36 It was good propaganda to juxtapose
Henry IV's virility with Henry's III's impotence, but at other
times the king's sexual behavior seemed dangerously out of
control; for instance, his designs to marry Gabrielle
d'Estrées in 1598 or his pursuit of Charlotte de
Montmorency in 1610.37 In a nuanced reading of the
iconography of Henry's reign, Crawford underscores that
the very masculine images of the king also contained
intertextual tensions that posited counter-images. She
argues, "The assertions of self-control and heroic masculine
33

Dickerman and Walker, 325.
Ibid., 315-37.
35
Edmund Dickerman, "Henry IV and the Juliers-Clèves Crisis:
The Psychohistorical Aspects," French Historical Studies 8:4 (1974):
635-7.
36
Katherine B. Crawford, "The Politics of Promiscuity:
Masculinity and Heroic Representation at the Court of Henry IV,"
French Historical Studies 26:2 (2003): 225-52.
37
Ibid., 225.
34
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comportment always contained the specter of incipient
sexual disorder."38
It is worth considering that the historiography of Henry
IV as a military leader has been too heavily influenced by a
popular tradition that focuses, somewhat proudly in modern
France, on Henry IV as a consummate lover and
womanizer. In part Henry's own self-promotion inspired
this tradition. It also derives from a historiographic
tendency to read his ability as a military leader from 1568,
when he took up his first command, to 1598, when he
signed the Peace of Vervins and ended the religious wars,
from the perspective and sexual antics of his entire life,
particularly the post-1598 period. Thus, the story of his
post-Coutras behavior seems all the more believable when
it is read in the context of his life-long sexual license;
knowing, for example, that he and Marie de Médicis fought
bitterly over his desires to bring all his bastard offspring to
the Louvre to live with the royal couple and their legitimate
children.
If this is indeed the case, it seems obvious that a reevaluation of Henry IV as a military commander is in
order. Thus, as David Trim argues in a very recent
reassessment of Henry's martial abilities: "The vert-galant
was indeed a "demon de batailles."39 His military successes
and the image they created in the minds of his people
explain his successful rule. Henry devised a long-term
strategy for winning the throne and implemented that
strategic plan while he personally led his men into battle.
38

Ibid., 252.
David Trim, "Edict of Nantes: Product of Military Success or
Failure?" in The Adventure of Religious Pluralism in Early Modern
France, Papers from the Exeter Conference, April 1999, eds. Keith
Cameron, Mark Greengrass, and Penny Roberts (New York: Peter
Lang, 2000), 97.
39
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Henry won his kingdom on the battlefields of France and as
a result brought peace to his realm. In the context of
military history, that fact alone should be the key indicator
in any judgment of Henry IV as a military commander.
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